Soviet Foreign Investment Laws and Practices, 1987-1990: A Practitioner\u27s Perspective by Zimbler, Brian L.
Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 5
1-1-1991
Soviet Foreign Investment Laws and Practices,
1987-1990: A Practitioner's Perspective
Brian L. Zimbler
Graham & James, San Francisco, California;
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian L. Zimbler, Soviet Foreign Investment Laws and Practices, 1987-1990: A Practitioner's Perspective, 4 Transnat'l Law. 85 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol4/iss1/5
Practitioner's Perspective
Soviet Foreign Investment Laws and
Practices, 1987-1990:
A Practitioner's Perspective
Brian L. Zimbler*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE GOALS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ............... 91
A. The Stated Objectives of Soviet Foreign Investment
Policies . ............................... 91
B. Actual Objectives of Soviet Partners in Foreign Joint
Ventures ................................. 94
1. Direct Access to Foreign Trade ............. 96
2. Administrative and Managerial Freedom ...... 98
3. Special Perks and Privileges ............... 99
C. Actual Objectives of Foreign Partners ......... 101
1. Vehicles for Exclusive Trade .............. 101
2. Focus on Existing Domestic Hard Currency
Customers . .......................... 102
a. Hotels ............................ 103
b. Business Centers ................... 103
c. Services of Various Types ............. 104
3. Establishing a Presence in the Soviet Market .. 105
* Attorney, Graham & James, San Francisco, California; J.D., Harvard Law School;
M.A.LD., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; A.B., Harvard University.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
4. Gaining Access to New Manufacturing and Productive
Capacity .. ........................... 106
II. TYPES OF JOINT VENTURS: FOUR MODELS .......... 107
A. The Quasi-Privatized State Enterprise .......... 108
B. The Quasi-Foreign-Owned Branch Office ....... 109
C. The Joint Venture Without a Business Plan ...... 110
D. Real Joint Ventures ........................ 111
III. SOME BASIC ISSUES ARISING IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
JOINT VENTURES ........................ 112
A. Which Structure? . ......... ........ ...... .. 112
B. Which Authority Has Power Over the Venture? ... 113
C. What Is the Authority of the Soviet Partner? .....  114
D. How to Repatriate Profits?.................... 117
E. How to Guarantee Supplies of Crucial Inputs? ... 118
F. How to Obtain Outside Financing? ........... 119
IV. CONCLUSION ........................... 120
It would be hard to exaggerate the present difficulties and
complexities facing foreign investors active in the Soviet Union. In
general, the success of any foreign direct investment depends
heavily on the economic, social, and political stability of the host
country.1 By early 1991, both local and foreign observers generally
agreed that Soviet economic systems had all but collapsed.2
1. Indeed, some developing countries' desire to attract new foreign investment has led them
to adopt legislation very favorable to foreign companies. See, e.g., C. HABERLI, I.s
INVfsIssEMENsS ETRANGERs EN AFRIQUE 295 (1979).
2. As the ECONOMIST concluded "the country is disintegrating." Now What; United In
Disunion, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1990, at 111. As for the economy, "five years after Mr. Gorbachev
came to power, the Soviet economy is visibly and catastrophically failing." Id. See Satter, Why
Glasnost Can't Work: A Pessimistic Report from the Soviet Union, NEw RFPUBLIC, June 13, 1989
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Amid the economic chaos, important political struggles were
underway which addressed virtually all aspects of the future shape
of the Soviet Union and its constituent parts. The stakes were
unlimited. Would the Soviet Union remain an integrated country or
break up into fifteen separate Republics, plus associated
autonomous regions and other political units? To what extent
would the central government in Moscow retain power over the
Soviet economy, and which industries, sectors, or organizations
would continue to answer to it? How should the agricultural,
financial, industrial, and other productive or service sectors be
organized? And most fundamentally, to what extent should the
Soviet economy shift to a capitalist-oriented, free market economy
based on entrepreneurial initiative, independent consumer and
investor decisions, and private ownership of property?
With such basic political and economic issues on the table, it
seemed that a new Soviet revolution was under way. Soviet buzz
words like perestroika (restructuring), uskorienie (acceleration of
economic growth), and novaia miysl' (new thinking), which had
been bandied about since 1985 or so, had generated strong
expectations, courage to seek real changes on the part of some
Soviet managers and politicians, and a consequent race for power
over economic decision-making among key national, regional, and
local authorities. The existing economic and political structures
were openly acknowledged to be inefficient and illogical, and the
emerging Soviet entrepreneurial class saw no reason not to create
its own new, quite different structures. In the absence of strong
central control over the creation of such new structures, there were
inevitable clashes between would-be leaders from different
economic and political sectors. All these would-be leaders seemed
to be asserting control over the same key assets.
Of course, this free-for-all atmosphere severely discouraged new
foreign investment into the Soviet Union. By early 1991, many
projects were put on hold or proceeded more cautiously; new
projects were often delayed until foreign investors could achieve
at 68. Cf. Parker, Inside the "Collapsing" Soviet Economy Reports of its Imminent Demise Have
Been Greatly Exaggerated, ATLANTic MorniLY, June 1990, at 68.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
some degree of certainty about the state of the Soviet economy, the
likely directions of future economic and political change, and the
operating ground rules for the projects. Such caution contrasted
sharply with the earlier days of perestroika, and particularly with
the strong enthusiasm of foreign investors in the period 1987-88,
when companies had rushed willy-nilly into the Soviet Union --
and particularly into Moscow -- to work with Soviet partners in
building and operating some of the first joint ventures.
At present, foreign investors and Soviets stand at a threshold. In
the future, whatever direction the Soviet polity and economy may
take, it appears likely that Republic, regional, and local authorities
will exercise greater direct power over foreign trade and
investment. Inevitably, the decisions of these authorities will be
based, at least to some extent, on the unprecedented experiences of
the Soviet Union with respect to foreign investment in the years
1987 through 1990. During this initial period, central authorities in
Moscow generated ground-breaking foreign investment legislation,
and issued volumes of orders, decrees, regulations, and other
sources of law. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)
Council of Ministers, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance, the
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the State
Foreign Economic Commission were key players in this law-
making activity.
Of course, the rules on foreign investment were merely a part
of the authorities' overall work product: they issued a seemingly
unending flow of sometimes-contradictory new laws and
regulations, touching on many aspects of the Soviet economy.
These conflicts and contradictions in foreign investment laws
mirrored the generally chaotic state of Soviet economic laws and
policies overall. The result was a situation of great uncertainty, in
which it was difficult for both foreign investors and their Soviet
partners to identify, let alone understand, the specific laws, rules
and regulations that governed their activities, or to monitor changes
in those laws and regulations over time.
For now, it seems useful and appropriate to review some of the
main issues and difficulties posed by the Soviet foreign investment
laws, such as they were, during the first three years of foreign
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investment under perestroika (generally 1987-1990). The inquiry
may be useful for several reasons. First, because of their innovative
character, the initial Soviet laws on joint ventures and other foreign
investments will inevitably influence future laws in this area, even
if they are generated by the Republics or local authorities. Second,
to the extent that deficiencies or gaps in foreign investment laws
were related to more fundamental difficulties in the underlying
Soviet political, economic, and legal operating environments (for
example, a general lack of rules permitting free-market behavior),
these difficulties must still be identified and addressed. Third,
thousands of Soviet organizations received the theoretical right to
engage directly in international trade during this period. Since
many of them sought to exercise this right and became familiar
with the existing Soviet foreign trade and investment laws, those
laws have already profoundly shaped the expectations and behavior
of Soviet entrepreneurs and managers. Consequently, foreign
investors should study the experience of the years 1987-1990 for
important clues about the attitudes and expectations of their
prospective Soviet partners.
The remainder of this article will review some key aspects of
Soviet foreign investment laws and regulations during the period
1987 through 1990, focusing on issues that are likely to pose
significant and continuing problems for foreign investors. The
following comments include a mix of legal, business, and
"common sense" advice that relies heavily on the author's
personal experiences. The author is not a Soviet lawyer, but rather
a California lawyer who has represented clients in approximately
forty business transactions involving the Soviet Union during the
period examined. The author's impressions of present Soviet law
and practice are heavily related to his own personal experiences in
negotiating particular transactions, and may not be accurate for all
purposes. Further, as the author frequently does, the reader would
be well-advised to consult with Soviet counsel before proceeding
to advise clients concerning matters of Soviet law. This is
particularly important given the evolving nature of the Soviet legal
system, in which new rules and regulations seem to be issued on
almost a daily basis. The advice of local counsel is also important
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because familiarity with fundamental principles of Soviet civil,
constitutional, and administrative law is essential to understanding
new laws on foreign investment.
An underlying thesis of this article is that during the period
examined, Soviet foreign investment laws and regulations were not
designed with one coherent purpose. Instead, new laws were
apparently designed by competing Soviet regulatory authorities
with varying agendas to pursue a mish-mash of different purposes.
Such laws did not necessarily serve the objectives of "liberal"
Soviet economic reformers. Ultimately, the lack of clear policies
underlying the foreign investment rules made planning nearly
impossible, encouraged flagrant abuses by some aggressive players,
hindered enforcement of the rules, and confused prospective foreign
investors
Part I of this article will briefly review the initial stated
objectives of the Soviet foreign investment laws, and compare the
actual objectives of Soviet and foreign partners in joint ventures
and similar investment projects. Part II will review four main types
of joint venture projects which emerged under the existing legal
system. Part IllI will identify some key problems, of both a purely
legal and a business nature, which were faced by joint ventures
under this legal system, and which might be more clearly addressed
by future, Soviet foreign investment laws and policies.
3. See, e.g., Golanov, Perestroika and External Economic Links of the Soviet Union, EUR.
A7., Fall 1990, at 36. See also Troyanov, Lack of Clarity and Legislation Affecting Joint Ventures,
SOTSIAUSTICHESKAYA INDUSTRYA, May 17, 1989; reprinted in EXPORTER, Aug. 1989, at 32-33. On
the chaotic legal situation, see also Papachristou, An Evolving Legal Culture, Business in the USSR,
Jan. 199 1, at 58-59; Glick & Klishin, Doing Business in the USSR. Welcome to the 'New Antipodes,'
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1990, at 28-31.
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I. THE GOALS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. The Stated Objectives of Soviet Foreign Investment Policies
The initial goals of the Soviet Union in permitting joint
ventures' between foreign and Soviet partners were set forth in
Decree No. 49 of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers On the
Establishment in the Territory of the U.S.S.R and the Operation of
Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet Organizations and
Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries, dated January 13,
1987 (Decree No. 49). Article 3 of Decree No. 49 states that joint
ventures shall be established:
to satisfy more fully domestic requirements for certain types
of manufactured products, raw materials and foodstuffs, to
attract advanced foreign equipment and technologies,
management expertise, additional material and financial
resources to the U.S.S.R. national economy, to expand the
national export sector and to reduce unnecessary imports.
In short, foreign investment was to encourage the in-flow of
foreign capital and technology to improve Soviet industrial and
agricultural production, to generate greater earnings of freely
convertible foreign ("hard") currency by export industries, and to
engage in import substitution.5
4. Until 1990, a "joint venture" - in Russian, sovmestnoe predpriatie - was the only clearly
permitted form of foreign direct investment. The legal nature of joint ventures was never entirely
clear, however. With respect to corporate-level taxation and limited liability treatment for investors,
joint ventures were somewhat akin to U.S. corporations; as far as direct management by the investors,
procedures for voting and decision-making, and profit distribution were concerned, they often seemed
more like U.S. general partnerships. In 1990, new options for foreign investment were apparently
created by the adoption of new regulations permitting "'joint stock companies" (aktsionernoe
obshchestvo) and "limited liability partnerships" (obshchestvo c ogranichennoi otvetsvennost'iu),
along with President Gorbachev's rather vague decree of October 26, 1990, stating that foreign
companies could own up to 100% of Soviet enterprises. See generally S.I. Morgun, AKTSiONERNoE
OBSHCHEsTvA, TOVARISHCHEsTVA, PREDPRIATIE (1990); Decree of President Gorbachev on 100%
Foreign Investment, Oct. 26, 1990, published in Izvestiya, Oct. 27, 1990; Zimbler, The New Soviet
Corporation and Partnership Regulations, 3 CALIF. INT'L L. SeC. NEWsl. 7 (1990).
5. For analysis of the Soviet joint venture laws and foreign investment regime, see Viehe,
Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union Under the New Regime - Boom or Bust, I TRANS'L LAw. 181-203
(1988); Ruth, International Joint Enterprises in the Soviet Union, 6 PAc. BAsIN LJ. 121-33 (1989);
Comment, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues, and Approaches For The American
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Decree No. 49 stood in dramatic contrast to the very restrictive
policies on direct foreign involvement in the Soviet economy which
had previously prevailed. In the recent past, foreign companies had
generally only been permitted to open "representation offices" on
Soviet territory,' which engaged primarily in sales and information
gathering. Some foreign companies did engage in limited forms of
local manufacturing or production activity, including
"coproduction.''7 In general, foreign companies were not allowed
to own a direct equity interest in Soviet assets or property, or to
take the leading role in managing local manufacturing or
production efforts
It is interesting that the Soviets first authorized joint ventures in
January 1987, prior to the adoption of more wide-ranging reforms
generally affecting the Soviet economy. For example, President
Gorbachev proposed a specific overhaul of the command economy
system in a major address to the Central Committee of the
Communist Party in June 1987. At that time, he proposed that
Investor, 19 LAw & PoL INT'L Bus. 851-92 (1987); Carpenter & Smith, U.S.-SovietJoint Ventures:
A New Opening in the East, 43 Bus. LAW. 79-91 (Nov. 1987).
6. This was permitted under the "Statute on the Procedure for Opening and Activity in the
U.S.S.R. of Representation Offices of Foreign Finns," Decree of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers,
May 23, 1977.
7. See, e.g., Miller & Surovell, Coproduction in the USSR: Joint Production without Joint
Ventures, 23 COLuM. J. WoRLD Bus. 61-66 (1988).
8. At least one Soviet analyst has argued that
the U.S.S.R. Constitution contains no bans on the establishment and operation of
joint ventures in the territory of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution is based on the
principle according to which any activity is allowed in the Soviet Union if it is
lawful and is not detrimental to the interests of society and the state, to the rights
and legitimate interests of Soviet citizens. The above permits ... the general
conclusion ... that the establishment on the territory of the USSR and operation
of joint ventures with the participation of Soviet and foreign organizations do not
contradict the spirit and letter of the USSR Constitution.
U.S.S.R. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE LEGAL STATus OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE U.S.S.R., 30
(1989). In practice, however, the participation of foreign interests in "joint stock companies," of
which there were a number in the 1920s, had generally ended by the early 1930s. Id. at 28. See
Comment, Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 16 HARv. INT'L
L. 390, 390 (1975). Other observers have argued that the present Soviet joint venture laws include
many provisions which are "unconstitutional either on their face or as applied." Osakwe, Cogitations
on the Soviet Joint Venture Law of 1987, 11 WHrmr I L REv. 473, 476 (1989). See Osakwe, The
Death of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Investment Policy: A Clinical Eramination of the Soviet Joint
Venture Law of 1987,22 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 1, 92 (1989).
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factories and state enterprises be given substantially greater
autonomy and become "self-financing," (i.e. financially and
legally responsible for their own success or failure).9 However,
even when these reforms were implemented, domestic organizations
never enjoyed the same degrees of freedom from centralized
economic control that were accorded to joint ventures. This was
true despite the U.S.S.R. Law on the State Enterprise (Association),
adopted in June 1987 and subsequently amended, which generally
ratified the "self-financing" and independent status of state
enterprises. °
In contrast with the laws applicable to state enterprises in 1987,
the initial joint venture laws appeared far more liberal. Joint
ventures between Soviet and foreign partners had substantially
greater rights and flexibility than Soviet state enterprises. Joint
ventures were free to set their own prices, while state enterprises
generally still had to comply with Gosplan12 and Gostsen"3
directives on pricing and related matters. Joint ventures had relative
freedom to make their own arrangements for hiring, firing, and
compensating employees; state enterprises remained subject to
9. Hence the rebirth of popularity of the Soviet term khoziastvenniy rashchior, meaning
"self-financing," that had existed in the Soviet lexicon for some time. See G. ARmSTRON, THE
SoviEr LAW OF PRoPmETY 24-47 (1983); Zimbler, Soviet Cooperatives and East-West Trade, I1
W-nrrmn L REv. 387,388 & n.5 (1989). On President Gorbachev's proposals, see Rogers, Glasnost
and Perestroika: An Evaluation of the Gorbachev Revolution and Its Opportunities for the West,
16 DEN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 209, 214-20 (1988).
10. See Supreme Soviet Passes Enterprise Law Enhancing Contractual Relations, SoviEr Bus.
L RE., July 1990, at 4. Further amendments to the law were adopted in June 1990, to take effect
in the years 1991 through 1993. Id.
11. Although this is mere speculation, the reasons for adopting these laws may have included
the desire of some national (i.e. "All-union") Ministries, using joint ventures, to attract foreign
capital to finance their own pet megaprojects. National-level Soviet authorities may initially have
conceived of the joint venture laws as primarily benefitting them, and no one else. It is significant
that the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, on which all heads of the Ministries sat, initially had the
exclusive power to approve or deny all joint venture proposals.
12. "Gosplan" is the state planning committee and traditionally has had responibility for all
economic planning in the Soviet Union.
13. "Gostsen" is the state pricing committee, and has traditionally determined the pricing
policy.
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existing Soviet labor legislation. 4 Within the limits established by
their own charter documents, joint ventures could independently
determine their own activities and goals, and directly enter into
contracts with foreign persons and entities.' 5 In short, joint
ventures enjoyed an extraordinary degree of freedom, at least on
paper, relative to other players in the Soviet economic system.
B. Actual Objectives of Soviet Partners in Foreign Joint Ventures
In practice, the motivations for Soviet organizations' and
individuals' participation in joint ventures extended well beyond
the officially-sanctioned objectives just described. Many Soviet
organizations, of course, legitimately sought foreign investors to
assist them with the reconstruction of outdated plants and factories;
re-tooling of such facilities to engage in new, often export-oriented
activities; 6 importing or sharing advanced Western technologies
14. Prior to June 1990, when the new Enterprise Law made clear that Soviet state enterprises
also could pay compensation in excess of the standard wage rates under certain circumstances, state
enterprises did not have much freedom in this area. Basic wage rates were determined centrally by
the State Committee on Labor and Social Problems and the All-Union Council of Trade Unions.
These organizations published a detailed handbook setting forth wages, and payments permissible by
occupation, skill level, and geographic area. In contrast, Article 48 of Decree No. 49 states that "joint
ventures shall independently decide questions of the forms and amounts for payment of wages and
bonuses in Soviet rubles, as well as questions of hiring and dismissal and other labor conditions,
while observing the rights of citizens provided by Soviet legislation." However, the distinctions
between state enterprises and joint ventures should not be exaggerated, since Soviet joint ventures
may remain subject to Soviet labor laws in certain respects. The applicable labor rules appear in the
U.S.S.R. Constitution, the Fundamental Principles of the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics on Labor
Legislation, the Labor Code and other sources of labor law. See, e.g., K. HOBER, JOINT VENTURES
IN THE SOVIET UNION Part VII, (1989); LUBIN, SOVIET LABOR AND U.S.-SOVIEr JOINT VENTURES,
IN LEGAL AND PRACTICAL AsPEcTs OF DOING BUSINESS wTH THE SOVIET UNION 369-80 (1988).
15. This was in contrast to state enterprises and other organizations, which prior to April 1,
1990, were still required to deal through vsesoyuznie ob'edinenie, or foreign trade organizations.
Initially, Article 26 of Decree No. 49 also required joint ventures to sell products on the Soviet
market only through foreign trade organizations; but this was changed by U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers Decree No. 1074 of September 17, 1987, which permitted joint ventures to buy or sell
goods on the Soviet market directly for rubles or hard currency. See Decree of the Central Committee
of the C.P.S.U. and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers "On Additional Measures to Improve the
Country's External Economic Activity in the New Conditions of Economic Management,"
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 41, Oct. 1987.
16. The author has represented a U.S. client involved in one such venture, "Armentoy," which
was registered as joint venture number 1674 in early 1990. This is a joint venture between Breslow
Morrison Terzian & Associates, Inc. (BMTA), a Chicago toy design firm, and ANI, a productive
1991 / Soviet Foreign Investment Laws and Practices
or conmercializing sophisticated Soviet technologies;17 and
learning modern accounting, financial, analytical and management
techniques and practices. These objectives are consistent with the
expressed goals of perestroika, and would clearly benefit the Soviet
economy over the long-term.
Other strong motivations have had little to do with the stated
objectives of the Soviet foreign investment laws. Given the sharp
disparity between the independent and unconstrained status of joint
ventures and the continued strong links between state enterprises
and the centrally-planned command economy, Soviet managers saw
tremendous incentives to enter into joint ventures for several other
reasons. First, some saw joint ventures as an effective vehicle for
trade with the West, and as preferable to conducting such trade
through existing Soviet channels. Second, joint ventures empowered
the Soviet managers to make their own management decisions,
rather than continuing to follow the decisions of their supervising
authority (which might be a Ministry or other "All-union"
organization in far-off Moscow). Third, many Soviet managers
were strongly attracted by the incidental perks and privileges of
involvement in a joint venture, including possible foreign travel and
professional interaction with foreign peers.
Below, each of these motivations is examined in slightly more
detail.
association in Yerevan, Armenia. ANI formerly operated an electronics-related defense plant under
the auspices of the USSR Ministry of Electronic Industry. In cooperation with BMTA, Annentoy is
now producing plastic toy trucks and other toy and game products, both for export and for domestic
sale. The trucks are sold for rubles in Detskiy Mir toy store in Moscow, among other Soviet
locations. See U.S. Toymaker Lines Up Old Soviet Military Plant, J. COMMERCE, Nov. 4, 1990, at 1.
17. It is well-accepted that the Soviets possess valuable technology, including a rich patent
portfolio, but have little ability to develop this technology for commercial purposes or to market it
abroad. See, e.g., Murray, Trading in Information and Technology With the USSR, 11 WHrrrIER L.
REV. 361 (1989). That some Soviet technology may have been "'borrowed" from the West does not
diminish its potential commercial value, although it does complicate the process of establishing title
and analyzing potential infringement liability in other countries. See Maggs, Legal Aspects of the
Computerization of Management Systems in the USSR and Eastern Europe, ch. 6 in LAw AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SoviEr UNION (1982).
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1. Direct Access to Foreign Trade
Ironically, although a prime goal of the joint venture laws was
to encourage new manufacturing of goods for export, many of the
first joint ventures engaged in reselling and "trade intermediary"
activities, rather than in export-oriented manufacturing. This
phenomenon was primarily due to certain inadequacies of the
Soviet international trade system. Until April 1, 1989, joint
ventures constituted the main exception to the monopoly of the
"foreign trade organizations," which still held virtually exclusive
rights to trade with the outside world. 18 Even after Soviet state
enterprises received the right to trade directly with foreign
companies, there remained relatively little incentive for them to do
so, since they did not actually receive much of the hard currency
generated by their export sales. Instead, Soviet state enterprises'
hard currency earnings were largely turned over to the central
government, with the state enterprises keeping only a set fraction
in accordance with existing norms (normativy). Soviet state
enterprises also did not control the hard currency budgets allocated
to purchase badly-needed foreign equipment for their assembly
lines, or consumer goods for their personnel. A large portion of
such hard currency expenditures was similarly controlled by their
supervising authorities.19
In contrast, joint ventures whose charter documents contained
the appropriate provisions were directly allowed to sell their goods
and services abroad for hard currency, and to keep and use the
proceeds as they saw fit. They also were allowed to purchase goods
on foreign markets for hard currency and, under Decree No. 1074
of September 17, 1987, to sell goods on the Soviet market for
18. Typically, state enterprises depended upon the foreign trade organizations to procure
imported equipment for them and to market their goods abroad. See Zimbler, The New Soviet Foreign
Trading System, 2 CALIF. INT'L L SEC. NEWSL 3 (1989). See also BLACK, TRADINO WITH THE
SovIEs: PROSPECTS AND SRATIEs, INFORMATION Moscow 163-67 (1987-88 ed.).
19. This situation was made worse by the so-called -40% decree" adopted by President
Gorbachev on November 2, 1990, entitled On Special Procedures for the Utilization of Foreign
Currency Resources in 1991. The decree generally required at least 40% of state enterprises' hard
currency earnings from exports to be sold to the central government in exchange for rubles. See
Pravda, Nov. 3, 1990; SovIET Bus. L. REP., Dec. 1990, at 6.
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rubles or hard currency. Ironically, given the tremendous pent-up
demand for foreign goods on the Soviet market, many joint
ventures decided to exercise these rights first, acting primarily as
trade middlemen, rather than focusing on manufacturing. Due to
the lack of an efficient distribution system and other anomalies of
the Soviet economy, such trading functions offered easy and quick
profits, as opposed to the challenges of manufacturing world-class
goods for export.2"
Soviet authorities eventually moved to "plug the hole" that had
opened up for these intermediary trade activities of joint ventures.
They did so in subsequent strict decrees on trade, commencing with
Decree No. 203 of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, On Measures
for State Regulation of Foreign Economic Relations, dated
March 7, 1989 (Decree No. 203). Paragraph 8 of Decree No. 203
states that "joint ventures, international amalgamations and other
organizations on Soviet territory may only export their own
products (work, services) and import products (work, services)
necessary for their own needs." 2 A few joint ventures are
continuing to act as trade middlemen, presumably because the
regulatory authorities have continued to respect the express
20. An example of a joint venture apparently engaging in this type of trading activity is
SOVAMINCO, a U.S.-Soviet joint venture that is well-known to foreign visitors to the Soviet Union,
since it has retail outlets in many of the prominent hotels and tourist spots in Moscow.
SOVAMINCO reportedly purchases foreign luxury products such as perfumes, liquor, and other items
on foreign markets and resells them in the Soviet Union for hard currency (one assumes primarily
to the foreign community and tourists). This sales activity seems rather far afield from the stated
primary objectives of the joint venture, which were to engage in publishing.
21. A specific license for "intermediary operations" now had to be obtained from the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Decree No. 203 effectively curtailed the much-vaunted
opening of the foreign trade system, which had reportedly been intended to make international trade
freely available to all types of Soviet organizations. The opening was supposed to occur on April 1,
1989, under U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Decree No. 1405 of December 2, 1988, -On the Further
Development of the External Economic Activity of State, Cooperative and Other Public Enterprises,
Associations and Organizations." See Zimbler, The New Soviet Foreign Trading System, 2 CAUP.
INT'L L SEc. NEWSL 3-14 (1989). At present, over 25,000 Soviet organizations have received
foreign trade licenses from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Nevertheless, the
central government effectively controls the export and import of virtually all important goods and
commodities, under a licensing regime administered by various national-level Soviet organizations.
This trade regime is set forth in various Decrees of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and Regulations
of its State Foreign Economic Commission (including the "Regulations on the Licensing Procedure
for U.S.S.R. External Economic Relations," dated March 20, 1989).
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permissions granted to these ventures in 1988 or early 1989.
However, other joint ventures attempting to engage in such
activities have apparently been terminated, and Soviet authorities
have clearly taken the position that such activities by joint ventures
are no longer generally permitted.'
2. Administrative and Managerial Freedom
A second source of motivation was the desire of the Soviet
partner to free itself from the heavy-handed management of its
particular Ministry or supervising agency. As mentioned earlier,
through 1990 much of the centrally-planned economy and
administrative structure remained intact. Despite all the rhetoric
about "self-financing" and decentralization, many individual state
enterprises still had little, if any, decision-making freedom in
practice. This also held true for state enterprises' participation in
the new joint ventures. Throughout 1987-90, a state enterprise
could only be involved in a joint venture with the prior approval
of its supervising organization.2" In many cases, such approval
would only be granted if there were probable tangible benefits for
the approving authority, as well as for the participating state
enterprise. It seems significant that in some cases, key personnel of
the Ministry or other supervising authority have "descended" to
the enterprise level so that they may work as officials of a new
joint venture.
22. For many observers, the abuses of the foreign trade rules were typified by the "ANT
affair." This was an incident in late 1989 when a Soviet cooperative was accused of improperly
selling twelve T-72 tanks to foreign interests. The affair has continued to generate controversy. While
it did not directly involve ajoint venture, the same types of issues are frequently raised in connection
with joint venture trade activity. See Balkarei & Teplyakov, Antgate: Who Stands to Gain?, BUSINESs
IN THE U.S.S.R., May 1990, at 60-63. See also MIKHAILov, SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE AND THE TANK
SCANDAL in 1 RussiAN Bus. REV. 10-12 (1990).
23. Section 2 of Decree No. 49 stated that the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers would approve
all joint ventures. Decree No. 1074 of September 17, 1987, delegated the authority to approve joint
ventures to the individual Ministries and Councils of Ministers of the various Republics. This
authority was delegated further to the -supervising administrative body" of the Soviet partner by a
decree of September 1988. See Vecchio, Soviet Joint Ventures: Keeping an Eye on the Goalposts,
INT'L FIN. L REv. 37 (1990).
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Once the joint venture was formed and the state enterprise or
other Soviet partner was authorized to participate in it, these prior
constraints no longer applied. Joint ventures were free to create and
implement their own business plans. In light of these unique rights,
and the often-supportive role of the foreign partner, joint ventures
could serve as a relatively safe haven for creative, independent-
thinking Soviet managers and technicians.24
3. Special Perks and Privileges
Some prospective Soviet partners have wanted to engage in joint
ventures primarily to have access to Western goods, contacts, and
travel." For example, in the author's experience, the scheduling
of meetings of the board of directors in foreign countries (at a
minimum, in the country of the non-Soviet board members) is often
one of the first activities undertaken upon the creation of a joint
venture, typically with great enthusiasm from the Soviet side.
While this is totally understandable, it indicates that Soviet
managers' motivations are not necessarily always focused on the
joint venture projects or operations themselves.
Access to foreign goods and hard currency is also important to
the Soviet officers and personnel of the joint venture. It has
become a practice of some joint ventures to provide hard currency
credit cards which their Soviet employees may use to purchase
goods at selected stores.26 This has resulted in substantial pressure
on other joint ventures to provide similar benefits to their
employees, or even to pay salaries to Soviet employees directly in
24. This point was made by Professor Ninel Vosnesenskaya, of the Institute of State and Law,
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, at a conference on "Negotiating and Implementing Joint Ventures
and Other Business Arrangements in the U.S.S.R.," Los Angeles, CA., Feb. 1990.
25. Keith Rosten has noted that "perhaps the major cause of the joint venture explosion...
is the Soviets' desire to take advantage of the privileges such agreements provide ... A lot of the
deals are phantom joint ventures that were only put together because the Soviet partner wanted to
take advantage of the structure .... - Patience, Stamina Needed to Forge Soviet Joint Ventures,
Corporate Venturing News, Sept. 28, 1990, at 1, 2.
26. "Sadko" and "Stokmann's," which sell imported food items and consumer goods for hard
currency on a retail basis, are two of the most prominent ones in Moscow. Significantly, both are
joint ventures.
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hard currency, despite the questionable legality of doing so.' In
addition, of course, Soviet joint venture personnel obtain access to
foreign goods and currency on their trips abroad. To maximize
their spending power, some Soviet business travellers have hoarded
their per diem expense allotments, which were intended to cover
food and lodging, to buy consumer goods.
27. Historically, Soviet citizens have not been permitted to engage in private transactions
involving hard currency. For example, Article 88 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic
generally prohibits transactions in foreign currency between or involving Soviet citizens on the
territory of the U.S.S.R.
A second relevant piece of long-standing legislation is the Law on Contracts Involving Foreign
Currency-Valued Items on the Territory of the U.S.S.R., dated June 17, 1977, that appears in Svod
Zakonov U.S.S.R., vol. 5, at 579-80. This law generally regulates the establishment of contracts
involving the payment of hard currency within the U.S.S.R. Part 3 of the law states as follows:
Contracts involving foreign currency which do not comply with the
provisions of this law are invalid. The purchase, sale, and exchange of
items valued in foreign currency or the use of such items as a means of
payment, conducted in violation of the rules of handling such items as
set forth in this law, shall result in administrative or criminal liability
in accordance with Soviet law.
This law authorizes hard currency transactions involving Soviet citizens only in cases specifically
approved by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and in certain other, exceptional cases (such as the
making of certain gifts of hard currency). Parts 5 and 6 of the law are apparently secret, and hence
unpublished.
A third source of law has generated considerable confusion in this area. This is Decree No. 712
of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers dated July 20, 1990, entitled "'On Improvement of Retail Trade
and the Offering of Services for Foreign Currency on the Territory of the U.S.S.R." Effective August
1, 1990, the Decree permits Soviet enterprises, joint ventures, and certain other organizations to
provide goods or services on the territory of the U.S.S.R. for foreign currency, with the prior
permission of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers or the Council of Ministers of a Soviet Republic.
Part 5 of the Decree provides that goods and services may be sold to Soviet citizens in exchange for
hard currency, and that the citizens may use cash, credit cards, or other means for payment. It further
provides that Soviet and foreign citizens may open foreign currency accounts with the U.S.S.R.
Vneshekonombank, by means of direct deposit of foreign currency or its transfer from abroad,
without limitations and without presentation of any documents to identify the source of the hard
currency. Many Soviet citizens have apparently interpreted this Decree as authorizing their direct
involvement in foreign currency transactions. Some have seen further support for their position in
Article 2(2) of the new Law of the U.S.S.R. on Income Taxation of Citizens of the U.S.S.R., which
went into effect on July 1, 1990. The latter provision states that taxpayers must pay tax on their
income in foreign currency, implying that such income is legally permitted. However, the provision
may have been enacted primarily to address the situation of Soviet citizens who work abroad.
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C. Actual Objectives of Foreign Partners
While prospective foreign investors have approached the Soviet
market with a variety of objectives, the limitations, risks and
uncertainties of that market have pared these objectives down to a
few fundamental goals which can realistically be pursued. Such
goals are not necessarily the same ones which Soviet authorities
would like foreign investors to adopt and pursue. Some of these
goals are briefly discussed below.
1. Vehicles for Exclusive Trade
As noted above, some foreigners and their Soviet counterparts
sought to use joint ventures as revitalized forms of sales offices or
distributorships. These joint ventures could replace the accredited
"representation offices" of foreign companies which had already
been permitted for years, but whose permissible activities were
quite limited. Moreover, instead of merely serving as a trade liason
office, a joint venture could form an active, close (even
"exclusive") relationship with a Soviet partner. For example, by
bringing a key Soviet supplier or customer into the joint venture as
a partner, the foreign partner might effectively monopolize a Soviet
source of supply for some key commodity or good, or a powerful
Soviet customer for some imported (generally manufactured) good
produced by the foreign partner or its affiliates. Ideally, the Soviet
partner would enter into exclusive supply or purchase contracts
with the joint venture as a condition of its participation. Even
without such contracts, the joint venture would create important
material, political, and psychological incentives for the Soviet
partner to trade with its foreign partner, to the exclusion of
international competitors.
As a more sophisticated variant of this approach, some foreign
companies sought to combine such trade-oriented objectives with
local, value-added manufacturing activities. For example, the
foreign company might "sell" an imported part or component
(which it had produced abroad) to the joint venture for use in the
joint venture's own productive activities. The resulting
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manufactured products of the joint venture could then be sold back
to the foreign company to repay it for the inputs provided,
generally at an advantageous price. Alternatively, the joint
venture's manufactured products could be provided to the foreign
investor as its share of the profits, again at negotiated prices.
Depending upon the world market value of these products, such an
arrangement could compensate the foreign investor for the inputs
it had provided, as well as for its fair share of profits. Such
possibilities raise issues of transfer pricing, fair treatment of the
joint venture by the foreign investor, and similar questions which
have been thoroughly examined in the literature of foreign
investments in developing countries.28
2. Focus on Existing Domestic Hard Currency Customers
Because foreign investors have only been allowed to repatriate
profits based on the actual hard currency earnings of joint
ventures, 29 many foreign companies have focused their attention
exclusively on serving the relatively few existing sectors of the
Soviet economy which already have hard currency to spend. This
type of activity illustrates an important, apparently unintended
consequence of the Soviet joint venture laws whose effect has been
magnified by the lack of convertibility of the ruble and other
restrictive features of the Soviet economy. Rather than focusing on
creating new, value-added manufacturing and industrial projects
(which the joint venture laws were ostensibly supposed to
encourage as a main priority), a substantial portion of total foreign
investment was diverted to capturing existing flows of hard
currency. This meant that joint ventures, whose flexibility made
them potentially powerful competitors, could try to draw hard
currency customers away from existing state organizations, such as
Intourist. It also meant that many joint ventures would focus on
28. See, e.g., STANSBURY, FOREIGN INVES7MENT RELATIONSHIPS, 1I NEGOTIATINO FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS: A MANUAL FOR THE THIRD WORLD (1982) at 7.AI.1-8.
29. Article 32 of Decree No. 49 states, "[t]he transfer abroad in hard currency of the amounts
due to the participants as a result of the distribution of profitsfrom the venture's activities shall be
guaranteed to the foreign participant." (emphasis added).
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tourism, business-related services for the foreign community, and
other "niche" business sectors which were not necessarily
accorded high priority by the architects of the joint venture laws.
Several examples of such projects follow.
a. Hotels
Many foreign companies opted to pursue hotel joint ventures.
These generally involve the renovation of an existing but
dilapidated Soviet hotel or the construction of an entirely new hotel
building and facility.3" The hotel may be operated by an
experienced foreign (or joint foreign/Soviet) management team,
whose duties include retraining Soviet staff and helping them to
develop an awareness of international standards of customer
service. The main attractions of such projects include the acute
shortage of hotel rooms (not to mention "world-class"
accommodations and services) in Moscow and other major cities,
and the opportunity to serve foreign visitors (often to the exclusion
of Soviet, East European, and other "soft currency" guests) who
have a ready supply of hard currency. Some observers have
suggested that the first hotel joint ventures to be "up and running"
will be the most successful, and that the great enthusiasm for hotel
projects may eventually lead to over-capacity in Moscow.31
b. Business Centers
These projects are similar to the hotels. The concept is to
renovate or convert buildings from existing uses, and to rent office
space in them to foreign companies and joint ventures for hard
currency. Office and commercial space is in very short supply in
many cities, and foreign companies have generally received
30. In Moscow, examples include the Savoy, a joint venture in which Finnair participates; the
Sovetskaya, an old and distinguished hotel which has been renovated by a French-Soviet joint
venture; and the Metropol, whose renovation was extensive and whose opening has reportedly been
delayed by technical problems and disputes among the partners.
31. In December 1990, a Moscow City Council official told the author that at least 28 major
hotel projects were being negotiated in the city.
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insufficient and expensive help from "UPDK," the Soviet
organization officially designated to provide office facilities and
personnel to foreign interests. Local and municipal authorities are
often involved in authorizing the use of existing real estate for such
projects, and sometimes seek an equity share of the project in
return.
c. Services of Various Types
Various schemes have appeared for providing business-related
services to the foreign community in the Soviet Union. Areas of
such activity include: Consulting, accounting, financial, legal,
translation, and transportation (i.e., providing rental cars with
drivers). To the extent that such services are provided by branch
offices of foreign firms (which are sometimes formally accredited,
sometimes not), they may actually involve little or no infusion of
capital into the Soviet Union, and in this regard are not
"investments" at all. However, many firms chose to establish joint
ventures with Soviet partners to provide such services. Critics have
suggested that some of these ventures are merely "fronts" for the
foreign partners, enabling them to acquire office space and
logistical support, rather than true joint ventures. Still, such joint
ventures do require some capital investment by both partners,
foreign and Soviet. More importantly, they may involve significant
commitments of human capital, especially when foreign and Soviet
experts are stationed and work together. They may also involve
"technology transfer" in the sense that the foreign personnel teach
their Soviet colleagues Western methods of running a service
business, and the Soviets teach their foreign colleagues about the
Soviet system, and serve as interpreters and analysts of ever-
changing Soviet economic, political, and legal conditions. 2
32. For example, several international accounting firms and at least one U.S. law firm formed
joint ventures in Moscow, as opposed to opening separate, accredited offices of their own. Indeed,
a United States government study issued in January 1990 concluded that -the majority of American
joint ventures [in the Soviet Union] are in the services sector." Survey of Ylews on the Impact of
Granting Most Favored Nations Status to the Soviet Union, USITC Pub. 2251, 1-7 (Jan. 1990) (report
to the Senate Committee on Finance).
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Like the hotel and business center projects, a main characteristic
of these service-oriented projects is that they primarily serve
foreign interests and clients. In this sense, they may be seen as
having relatively minor involvement in the direct development of
the Soviet domestic economy. They are indirectly helpful, of
course, since their activities facilitate direct investment by other
foreign firms. In theory, at least, they should also generate a
"trickle-down" financial effect, as some of the hard currency they
earn is passed on to the Soviet participants.
3. Establishing a Presence in the Soviet Market
Some foreign firms have apparently selected direct investment
as a practical strategy for entering the Soviet market and are
beginning to learn how to penetrate it. Their goals may include
establishing a "toehold" presence which can be expanded later, as
more favorable economic conditions emerge; forging long-term
personal and business relationships with valued Soviet partners; and
gathering information, in hopes of identifying and implementing
new market opportunities ahead of their international competitors
in the same business sector. Particularly in 1987-88, there was
much talk about "being on the ground" in Moscow or beating the
competition up the learning curve. There was also considerable
naive enthusiasm about "being there first" in a potential
marketplace of 280 million consumers. Some of this enthusiasm
quickly turned to disillusionment, as new foreign entrants began to
understand the disequilibria, obstacles and frustrations which
characterized this market, and the particular difficulties of
generating and repatriating hard currency returns on investment.
Still, other companies have apparently decided to endure such
frustrations as part of the costs of pursuing a long-term effort to
educate themselves about, and succeed in, the Soviet marketplace.
Some of the main obstacles to pursuing these objectives include
the lack of meaningful economic data concerning the Soviet Union,
particularly in areas such as production costs and prices. Thus,
there is precious little "information-gathering" to do. The
increasing decentralization of the Soviet Union and a lack of
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efficient communications make it more difficult to learn about
conditions in diverse markets (i.e. Armenia, Georgia, the Soviet Far
East, the Baltic Republics) by operating a joint venture in a single
location. Finally, the fact that many Soviet partners guard their
relationships with foreign firms jealously, impeding efforts by the
foreigners to leverage their participation in one joint venture to
build new relationships with other Soviet entities, creates an
obstacle for investors to overcome.
4. Gaining Access to New Manufacturing and Productive
Capacity
Consistent with the classic model for joint ventures, some
foreign companies do actually want to gain access to Soviet inputs
-- land, plant, equipment, technology, labor -- and to use these
inputs to produce products on Soviet soil. Although production is
often slated for export, some ventures involve limited production
for domestic as well as foreign sale, and at least a few generate
products which are to be sold primarily to Soviet consumers for
local currency. Foreign companies sometimes justify such locally-
oriented production as designed to engender goodwill and political
approval for their projects, or as part of a long-term strategy to
serve the domestic market "when the ruble becomes convertible."
The wisdom of the latter strategy seems questionable, at best, since
it is unclear when free convertibility of Soviet currency will be
permitted, and what the applicable exchange rates will be at that
time. More rational reasons for establishing Soviet-oriented
manufacturing capacity may include access to low-cost production
(including the use of highly-skilled cheap labor, although some
observers question whether labor costs will rise in future
inflationary conditions);33  obtaining sourcing capacity in
geographical proximity to key markets in Western Europe and
Asia; access to certain high-quality production facilities, especially
in the military-industrial sector (which is rapidly being converted
33. See Hertzfeld, Joint Ventures: Saving the Soviets from Perestroika HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1991, at 91.
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to the manufacture of consumer goods and exportable products);
access to key Soviet patents, trade secrets, and other technology
which has not previously been licensed to the West; and
exploitation of possible synergies between underutilized Soviet
assets and foreign technology, production methods, or marketing
techniques.
The main obstacles to these objectives are the same ones that
plague Soviet managers. These include: The disarray of the Soviet
economy, the unpredictability of supplies and bottlenecks in
production of important inputs, unmotivated workers, bureaucratic
resistance, and lack of cooperation. In a true manufacturing joint
venture, the foreign investor is competing on Soviet turf, under
local rules, and with primarily local staff, facilities, and equipment.
It is not surprising that so few manufacturing joint ventures have
been successful. Some which have "succeeded" (i.e. are still in
business) have pursued a strategy of full, vertical integration. For
example, McDonald's much-praised joint venture in Moscow
obtained and organized its own land, farming, food processing,
packaging, transportation, and distribution systems.34
In essence, successful projects may have to create -- almost
from scratch -- a complete and reliable economic and business
infrastructure to support their activities. This new infrastructure will
supplement or replace the inefficient or missing equivalents in the
existing Soviet system. The costs of creating such a complete
infrastructure for a single project can be extremely high, of course.
1". TYPES OF JoINT VENTURES: FouR MODELS
Due to the diverse and, at times, contradictory objectives of
Soviet authorities, and the fact that both Soviet and foreign partners
are involved in joint ventures, several familiar forms of joint
ventures have emerged. For the purposes of illustration, the
following comments will describe four separate types of joint
ventures which are designed with different primary purposes (or in
one case, no particular purpose) in mind. These types are merely
34. Id.
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generalized forms drawn from the author's experiences. In reality,
many joint ventures have shared certain characteristics of each
type.
A. The Quasi-Privatized State Enterprise
As mentioned, joint ventures were permitted before Soviet
authorities drew up and adopted much of the new legislation on
state enterprises, ownership rights, leasing, corporations and
partnerships, and other matters expanding the scope of commercial
activities in which state enterprises could engage.35 Consequently,
for a given period it appeared advantageous for some state
enterprises to "convert themselves" into joint ventures. This form
of joint venture was primarily a shell corporation through which
the existing plant, equipment, personnel, customers, contract
relationships, and other assets and attributes of the Soviet partner
operated, more or less as before. These assets may have been
contributed outright to the "capital stock" (ustavnii fund) of the
joint venture, leased to the joint venture, or provided through other
methods which were often not sufficiently clear or well-
documented. Through the magic of the joint venture laws, the state
enterprise and its foreign partners now enjoyed special tax
privileges,36 freedom from central government control, the ability
to reinvest or spend hard currency earnings freely, and the other
benefits described in Part I.
In short, the joint venture served as a very crude vehicle for
quasi-privatization of the state enterprise. Since the Soviet partner
in the joint venture remained the state enterprise itself, and since
the state enterprise remained subject to the restrictive controls and
status already described, it typically did not make sense for the
35. See Zimbler, supra note 4.
36. These initially included at least a two-year exemption from income taxes beginning when
a "balance profit" (balansovaya pribil) was rust declared, and negotiable special treatment with
respect to depreciation, loss carry-forwards, and other tax matters. The new tax laws adopted in 1990
clarified many aspects of tax treatment for foreign investment, and introduced some potentially
onerous new taxes, including sales and turnover taxes and an 'excess profits tax." See Lieberman
& Coberly, The New Soviet Tax System, TAx ADVISER, Jan. 1990, at 387-94. Important aspects of
future Republic tax policies remain to be clarified.
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Soviet partner to receive substantial hard currency dividends. These
would simply be taxed or siphoned away by a higher authority. The
Soviet partner often far preferred reinvesting such profits in the
joint venture, where they could be used to purchase or rent cars,
consumer goods, and other tangible benefits for joint venture
management and personnel; obtain new equipment for use by the
joint venture (and which, not infrequently, joint venture personnel
might use to "moonlight" for other purposes, especially in the case
of personal computers and the like); and finance foreign travel and
other perks. This often contrasted sharply with the desires of the
foreign partner, who wanted large hard currency dividends to be
declared and paid as quickly and as often as possible.
In many such projects, the role of the foreign partner was
minimal. It might provide some seed capital for renovations, hands-
on management assistance, new equipment, technology or
marketing support. However, the Soviet partner was essentially
running the same "business" as prior to creation of the joint
venture and did not really want to be told how to "run its own
shop." From the Soviet perspective, the foreign partner was more
of a nominal than a real participant in the project. The foreign
partner's primary role was to legitimize the special treatment
accorded to the joint venture, and the joint venture was in this
sense, somewhat of a "sham." 37
B. The Quasi-Foreign-Owned Branch Office
This model is the conceptual opposite of the "quasi-privatized
state enterprise." In this instance, it is the foreign partner who
dominates the joint venture, and the Soviet partner who is really a
nominal participant justifying the special status and privileges
accorded to the joint venture. As described in Part I, such joint
ventures may be essentially either sales or marketing offices for the
37. This description was used by Emily Silliman, another Soviet joint venture practitioner, in
a speech to the Soviet Law Committee of the San Francisco [CA.] Bar Association in July 1990.
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foreign partner, or engaged in providing services."8 In some cases
of which the author is aware, the Soviet partner is affiliated with
a highly-placed or well-connected Soviet official, who in effect
serves as a patron for the project.3 9
Generally, such projects do little to advance the development of
the Soviet economy, except for creating some incidental, secondary
benefits. Hopefully, with the advent of new laws making it easier
for foreign companies to operate directly in the U.S.S.R., and the
eventual creation of business infrastructures and markets to provide
key goods and services which foreign companies need to maintain
their local presence, the incentives to create such joint ventures will
be reduced.
C. The Joint Venture Without a Business Plan
Particularly in 1988-89, a number of joint ventures appeared
which seemed to have no focus or direction. Ostensibly, all joint
ventures were supposed to have a clearly-defined objective, and the
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance frequently required the paring-down
of over-broad statements concerning the functions and powers of
joint ventures in their charter documents. However, there were still
quite a number of joint ventures with apparent authority to engage
in a wide variety of business activities. Others simply disregarded
the limitations set forth in their charter documents, and engaged in
whatever business seemed available at the moment. Some of these
entities engaged in trade and "middleman" activities, as described
in Part I. Still others got involved in real estate investments,
equipment leasing (especially computer rentals), translation work,
consulting, and other lucrative activities.
38. See supra text parts I.C.1. and I.C.2.c. Such projects partly explain why foreign investors
frequently made only nominal capital contributions to their joint ventures. Soviet authorities
responded by proposing generally-applicable minimal capitalization requirements, which did not
address the fundamentally one-sided nature of such joint ventures.
39. Such situations obviously create potential conflicts of interest, and raise very sensitive
political and legal issues. For example, to the extent that a Soviet official benefits directly from the
project, U.S. investors should be aware of their potential liability under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982).
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Given the confused state of the Soviet economy, and the relative
scarcity of other players in the market with the flexibility, skilled
personnel, foreign contacts, and hard currency resources of the joint
ventures, it was perhaps inevitable that joint ventures would be
drawn to diversify their activities in this manner. Unlike planned
vertical integration efforts (as in the McDonald's example)
necessary to promote a single project or goal, such diversification
was primarily horizontal, and often had no clear purpose or guiding
strategy. Besides drawing the joint venturers' energies away from
their initially-stated objectives, such diversification created
confusion and encouraged a host of others to "bend the rules" if
they could.
D. Real Joint Ventures
Finally, there were some "true" joint ventures. These generally
enjoyed the benefits of advance planning on the part of the foreign
and Soviet participants; a clearly-defined and focused objective,
ideally supported by a written business plan; and sufficient
resources to attain that objective, or at least to pursue the initial
steps to be taken. Generally, both the Soviet and foreign partners
contributed substantial real assets to the venture, hired key
executive personnel who were committed to the venture's success,
and made available additional resources to permit staff training,
logistical support, marketing, research, and other key activities. In
practice, only large, multinational companies could absorb the
substantial costs, and business and political risks, associated with
managing an investment of this type, particularly over the extended
time period needed to make any real progress. (The cost of posting
one foreign executive alone in Moscow, with a small office, has
been estimated at well over $200,000 per year). The sheer size and
cost of such undertakings kept them largely out of the reach of
smaller, entrepreneurial foreign companies.
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III. SOME BASIC ISSUES ARISING IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT VENTuRE
Assuming that a foreign company and its Soviet partner have
identified a common business objective, and that creating a "joint
venture" is an appropriate means of pursuing this objective, there
are still a host of technical, legal, and business issues to be faced.
The joint venture must establish and maintain itself in an uncertain,
fluctuating political and legal environment. It also must obtain a
satisfactory degree of protection for the control, management, and
profit-sharing rights of the Soviet and foreign partners. It must
develop relatively stable sources of supply and customer
relationships within the context of the once centrally-controlled,
and now disintegrating, Soviet economy. Above all, it must
maintain its independence from various national, regional and local
authorities, and from other competing sources of economic and
political power.
These daunting tasks are individually difficult, and perhaps
collectively impossible to fulfill. Nevertheless, it is the duty of joint
venture partners and management, including their attorneys, to
tackle them. Some of the main difficulties likely to arise in the
future will be familiar to joint venturers who were active in the
period 1987-1990. A listing of some of these difficulties follows.
A. Which Structure?
By 1990, various types of legal entities were permitted to exist
under the latest national-level, or "All-union," legislation. These
included corporations, partnerships, and "small business
companies." It was not clear what relationship, if any, there might
be between such entities and the more amorphous "joint
ventures" -- literally, sovmestnoe predpriatie -- to which all prior
foreign investment legislation had referred. This created a potential
dilemma. On the one hand, if the joint venture and foreign
investment laws actually applied to Soviet "corporations" and
"partnerships," then it might make sense to structure foreign
investments (and the associated legal documentation) with express
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reference to these new types of legal entities. The foreign investor
could simply incorporate by reference into its agreements all of the
provisions on corporate governance, set forth in the new Soviet
corporation regulationsl rather than having to create them from
whole cloth. However, this put the foreign investor in the hands of
Soviet lawyers, legislators, and regulators to the extent that the new
corporation rules were incomplete or remained to be interpreted or
amended." On the other hand, if the foreign investor chose to
follow the more familiar "joint venture" format, it was consciously
choosing an amorphous legal structure of unclear status. There
were still many uncertainties surrounding the legal nature of such
joint ventures. 2 For example, how does one legally transfer one's
interest in the "capital stock" of a joint venture to a third party?
B. Which Authority Has Power Over the Venture?
As of January 1, 1991, it was widely reported that authority to
register joint ventures had passed from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of
Finance to the Finance Ministries of the various Republics. 3 It
was also reported that some Republics would not be prepared to
take over this responsibility until spring 1991.44 Ostensibly,
authority over other areas related to international trade and
investment, such as the issuance of trade licenses, also passed to
40. These were principally the "Regulations on Corporations and Limited-Liability
Partnerships," published on July 15, 1990, as approved by U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Decree No.
590, dated June 19, 1990. See Langer, Moscow Report, 9 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 6 (Nov. 1990).
41. To the author's knowledge, no implementing rules had been issued as of December 31,
1990.
42. This assertion should not be overdone. By 1990, a body of established practices concerning
joint ventures existed, as recorded in innumerable Soviet materials and "how to" books. See, e.g.,
VNESHTORGIZDAT, REKOMENDATSII PO PODOOTOVKE I OBOSNOVANIU PREDLOZHENH1 0 SOZDANit
I DEIATEL'NOSTI SOVMESTNIKH PREDPRIATIU NA TERRiroRn SSSR (1989); V. KASHIN, RUBL' PLUS
DOLLAR: KAK ORGANIZOVAT' SOVMESTNOE PREDPRJATIE (1989). Unfortunately, Soviet authorities
and partners often emphasized form over substance in relying on such guides and resources, resisting
departures from the "'standard" forms and making constructive business negotiations more difficult.
See Papachristou, supra note 3, at 58.
43. The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Finance reportedly suspended all registrations after November 15,
1990. See JV Registration May Shift to Republics, KOMMERSANT, Oct. 22, 1990.
44. See Ukrainian Bus. Digest, Dec. 15, 1990, at 40.
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the Republics.45 However, the obvious inexperience of the
Republics in handling such matters, combined with the severity of
the fight for power between the Republics and the central
government in Moscow, threatened to cause serious delays and new
obstacles to the creation of joint ventures.4" It seemed virtually
impossible to clarify with certainty which authorities had
jurisdiction over joint ventures and which rules or decrees of these
authorities were applicable.4'
C. What Is the Authority of the Soviet Partner?
One of the main difficulties faced by foreign investors is their
limited ability to confirm the legal status, authority, and credit
standing of prospective Soviet partners. At present, over 25,000
Soviet organizations of various types are registered with the
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations as entitled to
engage in international trade.48 Thus, for purposes of import and
export transactions, it is generally sufficient to obtain a copy of the
license conferred upon the prospective Soviet customer or supplier,
to confirm its authority to enter into a binding contract. In
November 1990, it was announced that the U.S.S.R. Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations would begin publication of a register
of all Soviet organizations entitled to engage in foreign trade.49
Prior to the availability of the register, it was necessary to research
certain official Soviet publications, such as Vneshnaya Torgovlya
45. A cryptic statement to this effect appeared in President Gorbachev's decree of November
2, 1990:
Ihe issuing of export and import quotas and licenses is to be switched to a
Union-Republic management system as of 1991.
Pravda, Nov. 3, 1990.
46. See, e.g., Hofheinz, The New Russian Revolution, FORTUNE, Nov. 19, 1990, at 127-34.
47. For example, the Russian Republic issued a great deal of legislation related to foreign trade
and investment matters in the waning months of 1990, some of it in sharp contradiction to the
corresponding laws of the USSR Supreme Soviet or decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers. See
generally Zakoni i Postanovlenie Priniatie Pervoy Sessiei Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR, June 14-July
14, 1990, published by Sovetskaya Rossiya.
48. USSR to Publish List of Enterprises; Ventures With Foreign Trade Role, SoVIET Bus. L.
REP., Dec. 1990, at 2.
49. Id.
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(in which lists of Soviet entities newly authorized for international
trade are regularly printed), to ascertain the authority of Soviet
organizations for trade purposes."
Despite this present ability to review trade licenses, and to
consult the limited available sources concerning such matters,
considerable uncertainties remain with respect to legal
authorization. For example, foreign investors and trade partners
may have difficulties in interpreting the scope or significance of a
trade license, particularly in light of the many amendments of the
foreign trade rules since March 1989.5 Further confusion has
been created by President Gorbachev's decree of November 2,
1990, stating that the Republics will become involved in issuing
trade licenses in 1991.52
With respect to the authority of Soviet organizations to enter
into joint ventures, the situation is also somewhat unclear. As noted
above, Soviet partners may generally enter into joint ventures with
the approval of their supervising organization, and the joint venture
may be registered by the Ministry of Finance of the appropriate
Republic. However, there may still be significant limitations on the
ability of a Soviet partner to enter into a joint venture. Several
examples of such limitations come to mind. First, a foreign investor
should consult the charter (in Russian, ustav) of the prospective
Soviet partner to confirnn that the Soviet entity has the legal
authority to enter into the joint venture, and to engage in other
activities contemplated in connection with its creation. Second, if
the joint venture is to purchase, lease, or otherwise use property or
assets of another Soviet organization, the foreign investor should
try to confirm the authority of the latter entity to engage in such a
transaction. This confirmation may be difficult. (For example, it
may be difficult to confirm who holds title to real estate to be
leased to a joint venture, or to a leasehold being contributed to the
capital of the joint venture.) Third, the legal and practical
50. See Zimbler, The Future of Joint Ventures: What the New Laws Mean, TRADING PERSP.,
Oct. 1990, at 3, 8.
51. See generally supra note 15.
52. See supra note 45.
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distinctions between the activities of the joint venture and those of
its Soviet partners or equity participants are frequently unclear.
This issue is most likely to arise in cases of the "quasi-privatized
Soviet enterprise," as described in Part ll.A. Where there is
considerable overlap between the areas of activity of the Soviet
partner and those of the joint venture, both the joint venture and
the foreign investor may be exposed to potential claims and future
disputes with Soviet authorities. For example, is the joint venture
using the state enterprise's equipment without proper authorization?
Is it operating under licenses or permits actually held by the state
enterprise?
A related issue arises with respect to the authority of individuals
connected with the Soviet partner to sign foreign trade or joint
venture agreements on its behalf. Under a 1978 decree of the
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers,53 to be legally binding,
international trade contracts must generally be signed by two duly-
authorized individuals on behalf of the Soviet party. The
appropriate persons are usually the director and deputy director of
the Soviet organization, or other persons holding a proper power of
attorney. It has sometimes been claimed that this decree applies to
joint venture agreements, and it is certainly prudent to assume that
it does. However, the author is aware of no clear rule concerning
the application of the 1978 decree to joint venture agreements. The
practical ability of a foreign party to ascertain the signing authority
of Soviet individuals remains quite limited. A possible solution to
this problem would involve the issuance of legal opinions by
qualified Soviet attorneys with respect to the due authorization of
the persons signing for the Soviet side. However, it is difficult to
imagine this solution being implemented quickly, given the limited
familiarity of Soviet attorneys with the use of legal opinions in
business transactions.
116
53. U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Decree No. 122, "On the Procedure for Signing Foreign
Trade Transactions," Feb. 14, 1978, SP SSSR No. 6, item 35. See, e.g., Rabinovich, The Procedure
for Signing Transactions with Foreign Trade Organizations, 22 INT'L LAw. 143, 163 (1988).
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D. How to Repatriate Profits?
The lack of free convertibility of the ruble is perhaps the
favorite complaint of prospective foreign investors in the Soviet
Union. Until the ruble becomes convertible,54 foreign investors
will only be able to repatriate hard currency profits from joint
ventures or other Soviet entities to the extent that the latter actually
earn hard currency, and that applicable laws entitle the foreign
investors to remove their share of these profits from the Soviet
Union. During the period 1987-90, a variety of schemes and
proposals were devised for circumventing this problem, including
convincing Soviet authorities simply to allocate hard currency for
distribution to the foreign investor, especially in "import
substitution" projects; obtaining preferential countertrade contracts
for the foreign investor, so that it would receive exportable Soviet
goods or commodities as its share of the profits, or be entitled to
purchase such goods or commodities with ruble profits; providing
the foreign investor with preferential access to "clearing
procedures" between the Soviet Union and other countries with
which it has special arrangements for convertibility, such as India;
or providing the foreign investor with access to Soviet trade credits
(in hard currency) with third countries, such as the People's
Republic of China.
A potentially complicating factor is the possible activity of the
Republics in addressing the convertibility problem independently.
For example, the Armenian authorities are considering the creation
of an "Armenian hard currency unit," which would be convertible
within the Republic of Armenia." Similarly, the Ukrainian
authorities have discussed preliminary steps toward the creation of
54. As this article went to press, there were reports that the Supreme Soviet was considering
major new legislation dealing with the convertibility issue. See Currency Vote Hel, ResultsAwaited,
U.S.S.R. Bus. REP., Mar. 4, 1991, at 1.
55. Comments of Tatoul Mannaserian, Director, Micrograf International, at Symposium "91 on
the Economic Restructuring of Armenia, Los Angeles, California, Feb. 22, 1991.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
a separate currency.56 Because of the difficulties of floating a new
currency in conditions of inflation and economic instability, many
observers are skeptical of such proposals. In the short term, they
are likely to increase confusion, rather than to address the
convertibility problems faced by foreign investors.
E. How to Guarantee Supplies of Crucial Inputs?
Because joint ventures are generally outside of the centrally-
controlled Soviet planning system, they must arrange for their own
sources of supply of key raw materials and other inputs. Article 23
of Decree No. 49 provides that:
a joint enterprise shall independently work out and confirm
the program of its economic activities. State agencies of the
USSR shall not establish binding planning tasks for a joint
enterprise, and the sale of its products shall not be
guaranteed.
Initially, as we have seen, joint ventures were to procure
supplies and inputs from the Soviet market through foreign trade
organizations, as if they were foreign entities.57 This left joint
ventures at the mercy of Soviet central planners, and of the state
enterprises that controlled key raw materials and inputs, with whom
the joint ventures often had no formal connection. To address this
problem, such key suppliers and enterprises were sometimes
brought into the joint venture as equity partners, ensuring their
cooperation. Such an inclusive approach may still be advisable for
56. As an initial step, the Ukrainian parliament has introduced coupons which consumers may
use to purchase scarce consumer goods, such as gasoline and many food items. These are issued to
Ukrainian workers in addition to their normal ruble compensation. The measure was first announced
on October 22, 1990. See Ukraine's New Coupons: First Step To A Separate Ukrainian Currency?,
Ukrainian Bus. Digest, Dec. 15, 1990, at 3.
57. See Gossnab Decree No. 74, June 4, 1987, on -Supplies of Materials and Equipment to
Joint Ventures Established in the Territory of the USSR with the Participation of Other Countries and
Foreign Firms and Marketing of Their Products."
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foreign investors trying to put together a joint venture which is
dependent on local sources of raw materials and other inputs.58
F. How to Obtain Outside Financing?
One of the principal problems faced by Soviet partners and
foreign investors alike has been convincing banks and lending
institutions outside the Soviet Union to make hard currency loans
to Soviet joint ventures. Typically, the lenders have been cautious
because of the limited track record of joint ventures; the perception
of growing economic and political risks associated with the Soviet
Union; and the unclear legal status of lending transactions and joint
ventures under Soviet law. Reportedly, some foreign banks and
institutions have made loans to joint ventures on the strength of
financial guarantees provided by the Soviet government, or Soviet
governmental institutions such as the U.S.S.R. Vneshekonombank.
However, as the Soviet credit rating has sunk in recent years,59
the ability and willingness of the Soviets- to provide such
guarantees, and of foreign lenders to accept them, has been reduced
to almost nil.
Present Soviet legislation does provide a minimal, if somewhat
rudimentary, basis for secured lending, although some lenders have
concluded that this is still inadequate to protect their interests.
Article 18 of Decree No. 49 provides that "a joint enterprise shall
be liable for its obligations with all the property which belongs to
it." However, Article 15 of Decree No. 49 provides that:
the property rights of a joint venture shall be subject to
being protected in accordance with the provisions of Soviet
58. See generally Arbess, A Few Things U.S. Businesspeople Should Know About Joint
Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Lawyer's View, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & Po. 411, 428-29 (1989).
As noted above, in September 1987, amendments to Decree No. 49 liberalized the trade rules
applicable to joint ventures, making it possible for joint ventures to buy and sell directly to and from
Soviet organizations, without the intermediation of foreign trade organizations. Joint ventures could
now determine the currency (i.e., rubles or hard currency) and terms of their transactions with Soviet
customers and suppliers. For a further discussion, see Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union, supra note
13, at Part VI.F.(1)(i); supra note 15.
59. See Soviet Payment Delays Now Require That Companies Use Caution in Arranging Terms,
Bus. AMmICA, July 2, 1990, at 12.
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legislation established for Soviet state organizations.
Execution may be levied against joint ventures only by
decision of the agencies which in accordance with legislation
of the USSR may consider disputes with the participation of
joint enterprises.
These provisions could be read to imply that a joint venture
may grant a security interest in its property, and that a foreign
lender could foreclose on that interest under certain circumstances,
but with some limitations which are unclear. Some parties to joint
venture agreements have attempted to clarify these matters by
adding specific provisions to the joint venture charter documents,
confirming the right of the joint venture to grant an enforceable
security interest. In some cases, parties have looked to the
provisions of the Soviet Civil Codes relating to mortgages (zalog)
for further legal support. By Western standards, the latter
provisions are not an adequate legal system for secured transactions
and leave many important issues unaddressed.6'
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has addressed some of the principal issues and
practices that were associated with the creation of joint ventures in
the Soviet Union during the period 1987 through 1990. During that
time, approximately 2,300 joint ventures were registered by the
Soviet authorities. Reportedly, less than twenty percent of these
ventures were actually operating, and a very small percentage were
profitable.6' As should be evident from the observations set forth
above, there were a variety of reasons for the limited success of the
joint ventures. These included the unclear and conflicting goals of
Soviet and foreign partners; inconsistencies and gaps in the
evolving joint venture legislation, which encouraged abuses and
60. See, e.g., Grazhdanskii Kodeks RSFSR, Articles 192-202 (1964) (the mortgage provisions
of the Russian Civil Code). A new draft law on secured transactions was being prepared by Soviet
legislators as of December 1990.
61. See Fadjukhina, American Investments in the U.S.S.R in 1 RussiAN Bus. REv. 39 (1990).
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manipulation of the rules, rather than creating incentives to
establish serious, operating joint ventures; and above all, the
chaotic and collapsing nature of the Soviet economic and political
environment. Even if Soviet joint venture legislation had been
clear, well-focused, and complete, it is far from certain that many
joint ventures could have succeeded absent dramatic, liberalizing
reforms in many sectors of the surrounding economy. Despite their
limitations, joint ventures were granted substantial freedoms to
maneuver and to establish and pursue their own business plans and
projects. However, with few local resources and virtually no
infrastructure to support them, the joint ventures were almost
doomed to fail from the beginning. The fact that the Soviet
authorities appeared to pursue conflicting policies with regard to
joint ventures only made matters worse.
Despite the current prevailing mood of gloom and pessimism
concerning the future of the Soviet Union, both foreign and Soviet
observers should carefully study the experience of the years 1987
through 1990 for clues about future Soviet policies governing
foreign investment. Whatever the future of the Soviet economy,
foreign investment will continue to play a role in this economy.
The Soviets are in such desperate condition that they appear to
have little choice but to continue to work with foreign investors, at
least in a limited fashion. Given this reality, future policies
regarding foreign investment should be designed to address the
main issues and problems that arose during the years 1987 through
1990, so that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated.
Of course, one of the main lessons of this period was that joint
ventures and foreign investment cannot succeed unless the Soviet
domestic economy is substantially reformed and
liberalized. Ultimately, a study of the difficulties experienced
during 1987-1990 may lead Soviet observers to redouble their
efforts to pursue substantive, market-oriented reforms of the Soviet
economy. If this does not occur, it is unlikely that substantial
foreign investment will be attracted into the Soviet Union, no
matter what types of privileges or rights are accorded to foreign
investors. It will become apparent that these rights exist primarily
on paper, and are not capable of generating a reasonable and safe
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return for foreign investors.
